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Introduction
This work has been done within the framework of AWAHF (Adjustment With A Human 
Face - a term ARJ thinks was initially mine but for which I doubt I deserve 
credit and with which am not so sure I am happy!). More specifically it 
arises from Ghana, Somalia and Tanzania supplementary adjustment and/or early 
human condition warning system missions for UNICEF and related lead papers 
WEP/ADB 1987 Food Aid Conference in Abidjan* for the Economic Commission for 
Africa's 1988 Conference on the Human Dimension in Africa's Priority Programme 
for Economic Rehabilitation.**
The main areas have been:
a. Production by poor peasants as a sine qua non for their improved food 
security or human condition;
b. Women’s work load reduction as a key means to - inter alia - enhanced 
food production;
c. Creative use of food aid to stimulate - inter alia - the first two 
objectives.
Poor Peasant Production
Many (not all) hungry African peasants are primarily food crop producers who 
cannot grow enough to meet minimum household nutritional requirements plus 
that portion of minimum cash expenditure requirements which they cannot earn 
except by selling food. This pattern is typical of the Upper and Northern 
Regions of Ghana. Except in the worst drought years they are in heavy food
surplus at physical flow and effective demand levels, supplying two staple
grains (millet, guinea corn/sorghum), a staple root crop (yams), a major 
oilseed (groundnuts) as well as livestock (cattle, goats) and vegetables 
(tomatoes) to the Forest and Coastal Zones and to neighbouring countries
(especially Burkina except for livestock which flows the other way to Southern
Ghana). They are also rice surplus but from a high cost, high mechanisation 
enclave not from peasant production. But in nutritional terms these are - 
both seasonally (pre-harvest "hungry season") and year round even in normal 
years - the most severe nutritional deficit regions in Ghana.
"Hunger, poverty and food aid in Sub-Saharan Africa: Retrospect and 
potential", published in Disasters Vol.10, No. 4, The International 
Journal of Disaster Studies and Practice, Research and Development 
Institute, London, 1986
** Available from Room 214 IDS
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The causes are at least fourfold:
a. low ability to produce by most peasant households, at a basic level
related to lack of applicable knowledge but at an immediate one to lack 
of basic inputs (e.g. matchets/cutlasses, hoes, seed, shovels, pickaxes, 
wheelbarrows, gumboots, snake bite serum);
b. major terms of trade losses from higher transport costs with the "outage"
of the main North Road and the abominable conditions on the secondary one
since the end of the 1970s;
c. the failure to act adequately to rehabilitate or to expand industrial and
export crop production (cotton, tobacco, shea nuts) which are partly
complementary in production, reduce weather risk and provide cash income 
other than from selling food;
d. failure to utilise food aid to provide employment on small productive and
infrastructural projects to increase overall and "hungry season" incomes
in normal and, especially, in drought years interacting with peasant
ability to finance their production rehabilitation, to have a higher 
productive capacity base and to be less at risk from future droughts.
The operational problem is not easily described as lack of political will. 
The PNDC is concerned that the Upper and Northern Regions are a periphery of a 
peripheral economy and set specific programming to assist them to produce more 
and to receive more basic services as a key priority in its April 1987 Donor's 
Group Submission.
But it is true that the Northern and Upper Regions are perceived as basically 
extraneous to macroeconomic and external account performance (except perhaps 
for the disastrous mechanised rice/irrigation sectors which do attract
misallocation of resources). This has been true of past agricultural and 
import support programmes which failed to give priority to restoring
(economically viable and locally preferred) domestic tool production to levels 
which would cause them to percolate north of the forest zone. Equally as of
March 1987 the Government of Ghana (or more specifically the Ministry of
Finance) had not included reopening the Great North Road in its Priority
Economic Programme but had included for 1987-90 over $100 million in export
logging evacuation highway reconstruction and improvement.
It is not adequate - nor even fair - to blame the World Bank and FAO for all 
this even though they are part of the perceptual problem. Indeed in April 
19 87 the efforts of the Northern and Upper Region's domestic and external 
backers received a dramatic payoff from the World Bank. The unlisted Great 
North Road IDA Credit project (submitted but apparently not prioritised by
Finance) was approved for over $60 million. Ironically, however, it was
billed as a regional linkage project to Burkina. While that is true and a 
significant side benefit to Ghana (and perhaps a greater one to Burkina since 
its main external route - the "Toonerville Trolley" rail line to Abidjan - is 
in parlous condition), it is not the basic justification for the project. 
That is the saving of up to 500 km (apart from quality of highway gains) on 
transport of - say - 350,000 tonnes a year of goods from and to these three 
regions.
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The April 1987 GOG proposals to the donors group (see Annex) marked a broader 
breakthrough on prioritising the Northern and Upper Regions in particular 
within the context of priority attention to the production and income as well 
as basic service needs of poor Ghanaians. Donor response was positive and an 
inter-agency World Bank led mission was dispatched promptly.
On the bulk of the proposals the mission's report was relatively to very
forthcoming. But there were two exceptions. These were:
a. production by poor peasants;
b. production by and reducing the workload of women.
Proposals under the latter head vanished virtually without a trace. One under
the former was - ironically - put in under labour intensive public works
assistance albeit it could have been self-financed at least after the first 
year and did not require hiring the villagers to do the digging. Most were 
set aside for a later IFAD and/or FAO mission to appraise. The import support 
(steel) for farm implement production proposal vanished without a trace as - 
one may well fear - did that for ox drawn, small scale, seasonal or pond
irrigated rice production. Apparently the concepts that poor African peasants 
can produce more food and that pump priming resource injections and
facilitating flows of inputs to be sold to them can pay off in economic as
well as human terms still have a long row to hoe before being operationally 
and programmatically accepted.
Women's Workloads - Production - Incomes
Generalising about Sub-Saharan African women in food producing households is 
risky. The leap from 'invisibility' to prominent, simple generalisations such 
as "The farmer, she..." is progress analytically as well as polemically, but 
only up to a point which is usually well short of programmatically.
That African rural women are "economically active" in even the narrow sense of 
that term is a safe generalisation. But not always in food crop growing - in 
some (by no means all or even most) Islamic areas they work predominantly on 
food processing, handicraft production and retail trade in their homes. Even 
in the more normal case of women working in the fields certain qualifications 
are needed to such sweeping phrases as "two-thirds of Africa's food is 
produced by women":
a. the gender division of labour by task and by crop differs markedly and in 
some cases both women and men engage substantially in most food crop 
production tasks (e.g. Bay Region, Somalia);
b. a food crop production system with no male labour input is - except for 
very poor female headed households unable to mobilise or hire any male 
labour - very unusual for staple crops. That is, most food crop output 
is a joint product even though the bulk of the labour time is female in a 
majority of contexts.
Perhaps a safer - and broader - generalisation is that rural African women's 
workloads vary from heavy (at low farm work seasons) to crushing (at peak farm
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work seasons). The reason is not only - indeed ususally not primarily - 
direct food (or other crop) production time. Rather it is the sum of that 
plus:
a. watering. Water collection is almost wholly a female - including both 
girls and women - responsibility and can often take 3 hours per round 
trip for an inadequate supply;
b. fuelling. Collecting branches, bushes, dead trees and - less uniformly - 
cutting live trees and branches is usually classed as "women's work" and, 
increasingly, is as time consuming as water collection;
c. tending the sick and getting them (especially children) to health points. 
Again this is (not just in SSA!) virtually wholly on the female side of 
the gender division of labour. In malnourished households with limited 
water supplies (for cleaning, washing, cooking), many children and long 
distances to health points, it can be very time consuming indeed;
d. food processing and handicraft production both for household provisioning 
and for sale. The former is dominantly and some branches of the latter 
frequently on the female side of the gender division of labour;
e. retail trading or selling to "wholesalers". Most SSA rural women do sell 
food, processed food products and/or handicrafts locally and/or to 
traders/transporters collecting for urban markets. Some also collect (or 
grow) industrial/export products (e.g. shea nuts in the Upper West region 
of Ghana) and sell them. Because few rural SSA households (including 
basic ones, not merely extended families) have unified budgets and there 
is a gender division of expenditure responsibility, women's cash incomes 
are crucial to household nutrition, environmental sanitation (e.g. soap) 
and children's welfare (e.g. clothes, clinic fees and - less uniformly - 
school costs especially for girls);
f. 'normal' homework. Cooking, cleaning, child care, etc., are just as much 
"women's work" in Sub-Saharan Africa as elsewhere (an objective 
description not a normative prescription by the present author!) and are 
much more time consuming than in the North.
This overwork problem has been exacerbated by the lack of articulated,
focussed action to reduce it. Women remain invisible - with side token
references and a few genuine exceptions - to most development analysts, 
practitioners and functionaries. As a result their workloads are rarely 
identified in detail or overall and still less rarely are articulated
programmes to reduce them identified or allocated significant resources. 
Projects are not so much rejected on cost efficiency grounds as rarely
visualised or spelled out in the first place. This is by no means simply a
matter of lack of concern - when countries with some concern do list 
programmes positively affecting women, movement to near universal access to 
primary education, to primary/preventative health care within 5 kilometres, to 
40 to 50? (at least if maintenance were improved) rural access to nearly pure 
water do not figure on the lists because their special relevance to women is 
invisible. There is an objective perception and conceptualisation problem 
quite apart from traditional/colonial attitudes toward women.
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It would be both philistine and fatuous to suppose (as some social cost 
benefit analyses of - for example - water projects do) that time saved on the 
foregoing functions should or would all go to increased food production. But 
at some seasons at least part of it certainly would. This may be particularly 
true in respect to secondary, nutrition enhancing food (e.g. green vegetable) 
production. Or at any rate so say many of those (few) rural African women 
when (rarely) someone bothers to ask them.
This suggests that enhancing women's ability to produce food for household 
self-provisioning cannot and need not be approached solely (perhaps not 
primarily) by technological innovations in food production. Parallel avenues 
include:
a. input provision for present or known desired lines of production. For 
example, in Northern and Upper Ghana matchets and hoes (for general food 
production), seeds (for vegetable production), matchets, rubber boots and 
snake serum in health posts (for de-snaking, protection against snakes, 
treatment if bitten to augment shea nut collection);
b. infrastructure restoration such as tools to de-silt natural and 
artificial ponds in Northern and Upper East Ghana so that adequate water 
for spot irrigation of gardens (and watering of livestock) is again 
available;
c. accessible basic services provision notably health services (preventative 
and basic curative) and water (preferably pure but even accessible, 
purifiable water in adequate quantities is, in itself, a major gain);
d. food processing technology which is cost accessible and user friendly. 
For example, Botswana millet and sorghum husking/milling innovations 
suitable for household or village use reduce labour time by up to 
two-thirds (with a spin-off effect of reducing women's preference for 
maize because it takes about a fourth as long to prepare and thus 
potentially reducing the growing of maize in ecologically hyper-risky 
zones);
e. income augmenting innovations tied to specific contexts. For example, in 
Ghana (coastal and forest zone to date in this case) adapted small maize 
mills have allowed small groups of women both to produce weaning food for 
their households and to earn cash incomes by selling it and/or maize 
meal. In the shea nut case, women collectors usually sell by the pan to 
middlemen (literally) who provide bulking, bags, a few days storage and 
sell for cash to the Cocoa Board for twice what they pay the female 
collectors. Provision of working capital to women's groups for bags and 
of education to farm/run their own co-ops to sell to Cocobod (which 
thinks shea nuts are "grown” not collected and that male middlemen are 
the "producers") is apparently a feasible way forward (unless you are a 
middleman!). More generally the Great North Road's restoration (most 
Northern and Upper Region rural roads/tracks are useable most of the 
year) should both lower transport costs and increase numbers of 
buyers/transporters with probable positive real income impact.
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Which activities should be focussed on women to the exclusion of men is 
complex. In many cases programmes will be self-selecting - few men grow 
vegetables, collect shea nuts or produce weaning food. In others - e.g. 
primary education - universality is probably the most effective way to reduce 
inequality of access against women and girls.
In general, specific women's programmes - unless organised by women or 
reasonably strong women's organisations - tend to be or to become marginalised 
and to attract few resources and more rhetoric than serious policy attention. 
This may well be the result of male chauvinism, but it is also a fact. 
Similarly while rural SSA women do operate in - and seek to make use of the 
possibilities within - gender divisions of labour, income and budgetary 
responsibilities, they do not desire, in general, greater fragmentation of 
households. (The South African woman's leader who dumbfounded a UK feminist 
by saying her first priority was to be able to live with her husband 
illustrates - if in an extreme context - this point.)
However, programmes which are not informed by knowledge of the actual, local 
gender division of labour are unlikely to be fully effective. One 
agricultural extension corps (male) for men and another (female) for women is 
unlikely to be a useful (indeed even an operational) concept but a single 
corps nearly totally innocent of the gender division of labour and to whom 
women are invisible (even in some cases when in fact extension personnel 
usually do speak to - or at least in the presence of - both male and female 
household members) is an absurdity from a functional point of view just as 
much as it is a glaring case of subordination of women. It is not much use to 
teach men how to weed or to sort picked cotton if (as is frequently the case) 
75% to 90% of these tasks are done by women. Nor is it production efficient 
to overlook that frequently 25% of peasant households are permanently or 
usually female headed and often face quite specific labour input and 
production constraints.
These points are not limited to crop production. For example, they apply to 
simple water projects. Under most 'traditional' (or adapted traditional) 
gender divisions of labour, men are - and see themselves to be responsible for 
much or most of the labour to construct wells, ditches, spring protection 
works, but see routine protection and maintenance as "women's work". In that 
context it makes little sense to involve only men in planning projects (which 
women will operate) and to train men (if anyone) in maintenance which women 
will be expected to do.
The standard complaint that pump handles are too high because they are 
designed for men seems to be a confusion. They are designed for adults and 
frequently young girls are a high proportion of the users. However, the point 
that involving women in planning would provide the specialised knowledge 
needed to avoid design errors presumably remains valid - they know who 
collects the water and how tall they are not.
It can be objected that the whole foregoing approach accepts (implicitly at 
least) a gender division of labour, income and budgetary responsibility which 
is inherently unequal and therefore constitutes increasing efficiency in 
exploiting women not a step toward liberating them. While overstated, that 
objection certainly has a core of validity - the evolving traditional 
divisions of labour, income and budgetary responsibility (static and
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primordial they are not) are hardly egalitarian between the sexes.
But these divisions do exist. They are most unlikely to be altered radically 
in the short run. Women's work loads can be reduced and their household 
provisioning/income earning capacities raised within them. Neither is likely 
to happen by ignoring or only condemning their existence. Most rural SSA 
women and women's organisations do appear to want concrete, immediately 
implementable measures in the directions cited above.
This in no way denies that changes in gender divisions (including, ones of 
power) are equitable/desirable and may be attainable. But that longer term 
process falls outside the scope of this paper and of the competence of a male 
macro-economist and one who is a Northern expatriate student and sojourner, an 
expatriate still even if one with over a quarter century of African 
experience.
Developmental Uses of Food Aid
Food aid is usually considered in the contexts of disaster relief (survival), 
general balance of payments/budgetary support or particular, narrowly defined 
projects. The first and third are usually seen as requiring literal physical 
distribution of the imported food aid to the intended beneficiaries. Only the 
second is perceived as related to any general developmental process and then 
very vaguely (when vertically untied as to use of proceeds) or fragmentarily 
(when - at least nominally - project tied).
The only two SSA cases in which food aid is arguably perceived and articulated 
in a national development strategy context are Botswana and Cape Verde.
Food aid could be used to make a much greater contribution to production by 
poor peasants and to reducing rural women's work overload than is now the 
case. This is true of disaster relief as well as of longer term, normal year 
programmes. One reason this has not happened may be that food aid's origins 
appear to lie in ad hoc humanitarian support for survival and North centred 
tactics for disposing of burdensome overproduction. Neither, by itself, gives 
rise to medium and long term SSA national and local contextual 
conceptualisation and planning for optimal use, albeit neither is inherently 
inconsistent with such conceptualisation and planning.
Key elements in such an approach are likely to include:
a. small labour intensive rural public works (directly productive and 
infrastructural) relevant to poor peasants;
b. support for rehabilitation and production capacity/time saving inputs in 
support of poor peasant production expansion and women's 
production/income augmentation and workload reduction;
c. support for domestic costs of basic services programmes (e.g. health, 
education, water).
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Commodity aid more broadly may have parallel potential. Two examples include 
steel for hand implement production (and for rural artisanal tool fabrication) 
and basic drugs for primary health services. As with food aid,* a similar, 
designated cash support for the programme would usually be more cost efficient 
but may often be less available or available only at a lower level.
Selected Indian and African (e.g. Zimbabwe, Botswana, erosion control and
community reafforestation in Ethiopia) experiences suggest that food aid 
(usually in monetised form) can support useful labour intensive construction 
projects. To do so during disasters (i.e. famines averted by use of food 
aid/proceeds of food aid) helps allow peasants to stay on the farm. This both 
avoids the (unavoidable) horrors of ad hoc mass camps and of flight to them 
and puts the people affected in a position (literally) to combine survival
with rehabilitation of their productive capacity when the rains return (or go 
away in flood or washout cases). Both are relevant to sustaining
self-reliance and self-respect (as is providing money for genuinely useful 
work to buy food rather than a food handout).
Even in normal years such programmes can be valuable in poor rural areas with 
inadequate food production levels, annual hungry seasons and limited 
opportunities for earning cash incomes other than by selling food, e.g. 
Northern and Upper Ghana. In these - as in survival support cases -
seasonally biased, supplementary work for large numbers, not year round, full 
time employment for a few, is desirable from income and poor household 
productivity augmentation perspectives. Admittedly it does pose certain 
construction scheduling and efficiency problems. (As dry seasons are good for 
rural construction and project design should, by definition, concentrate on 
unskilled labour, these problems, while real, should not be exaggerated.)
Project identification and pre-preparation is usually possible - albeit it 
does require articulated, contextual forward planning. This is true not only 
for public works per se (where some African PWD's with or without ILO 
assistance have proven both forthcoming and creative when asked) but also for 
production capacity enhancement. The Ethiopian erosion control, land 
reclamation, community forestry cases are well known.
An example in Upper East and Northern Ghana is pond de-silting. About 1,000 
small natural and check dam ponds used for human and livestock water supply 
and spot irrigation have become seriously affected by silting. Digging out 
the mud and rocks requires labour (which might in fact be mobilised on a 
community basis in many cases) and simple tools (shovels, pickaxes, crowbars, 
wheelbarrows) which have been physically unavailable in the regions for years 
albeit national production capacity exists and is partly operational. The 
proceeds of food aid (possibly with parallel steel commodity aid sold to the 
tool producers to ensure adequate supply) could finance both the labour and 
the tools. The programme would be self-liquidating, i.e. once the tool stock 
was restored and deferred maintenance cleared, replacements and ongoing 
maintenance could (and almost certainly would) be within peasant household and 
community capacity. Gains would include saving of time on dry season water 
collection and stock watering, reduction of livestock losses, augmentation of 
grain production, facilitation of women’s (desired by many of them) building 
up spot irrigated production of vegetables and other secondary crops for 
household nutrition improvement and sale.
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The rehabilitation input factor is included in the above example. It applies 
more generally in terms of seeds, tools, core livestock and similar items. In 
these cases physical availability is often as much of a problem as purchasing 
power so that procurement and distribution (whether free, on credit or to be 
purchased out of income earned on work projects) may be more frequently needed 
than for food proper.
Inputs into basic service programmes in rural SSA (preventative and primary 
health care, primary and adult education, water, effective agricultural and 
other extension services) can be justified on the basis that poor people 
matter. However, the present point is that in most cases they are production 
effective in the short and long run (incentive to "stay on the farm", time 
saving, ability to work hard, available knowledge and skills) and, in 
particular, highly relevant to reducing women's work overload and augmenting 
their time available for/devoted to food production.
Salaries can fairly obviously be paid with the proceeds of food aid. So can 
local materials for furnishings and local labour for fabricating furnishings 
and building maintenance/construction. These can also contribute to the goal 
of raising poor farming household incomes from sales other than food and from 
wage earning opportunities.
There can - but need not - be a contradiction between community support for 
basic services provision and food aid's use for the same purpose. In the 
first place in some contexts (e.g. rural Somalia and to a degree Northern and 
Upper Ghana) the most cost effective/user friendly forms of support are likely 
to include providing rural basic service personnel with food and/or additional 
labour to help grow crops or tend livestock. Effective Ghanaian health post 
operators (part time, nominally unpaid) seem to receive community help on 
their farms in return for the time they spend on their health duties. Both 
rural Koranic teachers and community health workers in Somalia are paid by 
their communities, dominantly in the form of food (e.g. one goat a month per 
pupil with a camel for successful course completion in some Koranic schools). 
So long as food aid is monetised to pay cash salaries, it complements 
community food payments rather well. In respect to labour either a ceiling on 
paid time or its limitation to certain functions (or both) could allow 
supplementary income providing employment and community contributions in 
labour time to live together, albeit there are real practical problems in this 
case.
Perhaps ironically this is a very market oriented approach to food aid, 
frequently opposed by institutions and individuals who in most other contexts 
profess greater faith in markets than that of the present author. Normally in 
rural SSA food exists as do local market modalities adequate to its delivery 
at costs rather to radically less than moving imported food from the point of 
import through an ad hoc food aid distribution chain. The linked basic rural 
problems are of ability to produce enough for household use and of 
entitlements. The main food shortages in physical terms are urban and there 
for the bulk of would-be consumers the cash to purchase (if famine level 
prices are averted) does exist as does a functional wholesale/retail network.
The major exceptions are the urban poor (outside the scope of the present 
paper) and major, sudden rural crop failures. The word sudden is relevant. 
Even in widspread rural crop failure cases, it is not impossible to implement
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cash for work schemes backed by injection of food into commercial channels to 
prevent price blast-off into famine orbits. This approach helps allow 
peasants to remain on their farms, to prepare for self-rehabilitation of 
production, to avoid the horrors of hastily thrown together camps, to retain 
self-reliance and self-respect. Zimbabwe from 1983 and parts of Ethiopia in 
1985 and this year demonstrate its practicability. If no proper pre-disaster 
organisation, mobilisation, procurement, distribution has taken place (or if - 
as in Mozambique - one is in the middle of a hot war) the first need may well 
be to move physical food to internal refugees in camps - survival is a 
precondition for rehabilitation. But most such cases underline the brutal, 
damning fact that disaster relief is itself a disaster area staffed by 
technical personnel who can say in all innocence and with good intentions, 
"but you do not understand ... disaster is our bread and butter".
In the ongoing programme context physical food fetishism can lead to 
absurdities which would be hilarious if they were not seriously put forward by 
serious development finance institutions. For example, in Somalia (which has 
a perfectly reasonably functioning nationwide commercial food distribution 
system) it has been seriously proposed that food aid to support resuscitation 
of primary education be handled by (almost literally ) 10,000 weekly cartons 
of 10 foods to primary school teachers scattered all over Somalia! Apart from 
appearing to illustrate "Stalin Planning" (in the perjorative sense) at its 
worst; that lumbers the very difficult task of putting primary education on 
its feet with the quite unrelated one of operating a high cost, parallel 
wholesale and retail food distribution system to by-pass functioning markets 
and deliver food packets almost certainly not corresponding very well to what 
90% of the recipients would have chosen to spend the equivalent cash income to 
purchase.
Money is more fungible, more portable and only slightly easier to 
'lose'/divert than food. Most commercial food markets function (and function 
better if food aid is sold into them at plausible prices - those in Somalia 
are admittedly too low to arable crop peasants' and the government's loss 
primarily to the benefit of overseas remittance recipients who are 
predominantly not absolutely poor).
The same two problems/barriers relating to acting to facilitate poor peasants 
producing more appear to apply in setting up non-market parallel channels is 
(except in extreme disaster survival cases) expensive, unnecessary and 
inefficient.
Conclusion - or Hopefully Not Yet
Food security for low income/nutritionally deprived rural SSA households 
depends primarily on these households being empowered to produce more food and 
secondarily on their having access to more other sources of cash income so 
that they can afford to eat more and sell less food.
Practicable, contextual measures toward those ends can be identified. The key 
problems confronting movement to broader implementation do not lie there but
in:
a. a perception that such increases in poor peasant self-provisioning food
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production/cash incomes are basically irrelevant to macroeconomic and 
external balance concerns.
b. a failure to accept at operational level the concept that poor people 
really can produce more with relatively low cost (cost efficient) 
support.
Women's workload - or rather overworkload - is central to the liberation (or 
rather non-liberation) of rural SSA women and to increasing household (and 
especially child) food security. Because the workload is not only - or even 
dominantly in most cases - food production work, action to reduce it needs to 
be both context specific and broader than agricultural innovation. Again it 
is by no means difficult in many contexts to identify specific projects which 
appear relevant, potential user friendly and low cost.
To do this requires understanding and relating to the 'evolving traditional' 
gender divisions of labour, of income and of budgetary responsibility. That 
these are usually less than equitable and are candidates for change is true 
but does not contradict the points that significant gains can be achieved 
within these divisions and that winning such gains can often be a reasonably 
short run goal whereas basic gender role division changes are likely to take 
much longer.
Food aid can be utilised to deal with some aspects of poor peasant and 
specifically women's production and income augmentation. This is rarely
systematically conceptualised or articulated in existing food aid programmes
(at least in SSA outside Cape Verde and Botswana).
Among the programmatic areas are labour intensive rural works (both
infrastructural and directly productive and both famine year and normal year 
in areas of limited cash income generation possibilities), domestic cost 
support for basic services and financing of support inputs (e.g. simple tools) 
into poor peasant production and women's time-saving projects. These
approaches would make disaster relief food aid more supportive if allowing 
peasants to stay on the farm, prepare for rehabilitation of their production, 
reduce future vulnerability and retain their self-reliance and self-respect. 
One key requirement at that level and even more in ongoing programme support 
is overcoming physical food fetishism and a crude form of material balances 
planning by monetising the bulk of food aid in ways improving food market 
system functioning rather than seeking to set up high cost, inefficient 
non-market parallel distribution systems.
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ANNEX
Production By, Services With Poor People: Programme Notes
The purpose of this annex is to illustrate the possibility of building up a 
potentially financeable, cost effective, interlocking programme whose 
components add up to a significant assault on poverty and vulnerability. The 
actual projects are actual or proposed ones from Ghana and the overall 
programme is based on that presented to a Consultative Group meeting by the 
Government of Ghana but the presentation and interpretation are those of this 
paper and should not be seen as necessarily representing those of the 
Government of Ghana.
Components: Toward Interaction and Critical Mass
The programme includes nine components:
1. Strenghtening and expanding primary health care with particular priority 
to rural areas and urban low income neighbourhoods;
2. Reinforcing primary and adult education through improvement of textbook 
and basic furnishings supplies and improved building maintenance;
3- Sustaining the borehole rural water programme serving up to a third of
the rural population through creating an ultimately self financing 
maintenance programme;
Augmenting peasant productive capacity by restoring national availability 
of basic agricultural and related implements (matchets, hoes, picks, 
shovels, sledge hammers, crowbars, wheelbarrows) through providing
adequate secure intermediate input supplies to existing, efficient
domestic manufacturers;
5. Reducing seasonal and drought vulnerability through a selective, largely 
seasonal, labour intensive rural and urban works programme;
6. Increasing womens ability to increase household provisioning and income 
earning capacity via improved fish smoking, weaning food production/grain 
grinding, vegetable growing and shea nut collection and marketing;
7. Creating a focus on the people of the most deprived and vulnerable 
regions (the Upper West, Upper East and Northern) within the previous 
project clusters and by their use to support/facilitate land and water 
reclamation (pond desilting);
8. Improving basic service provision capacity by augmenting mobility via
improvement and parts stock restoration for vehicle maintenance and
repair workshops (initially in support of primary health care);
9. Data stock and flow reinforcement through a poor rural household 
income/expenditure/social and human condition survey and establishment of 
an early warning system for nutrition and health going beyond purely
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meteorological and technical agronomic data.
The components are intended to generate a critical mass i.e. to assist a 
substantial proportion of poor and vulnerable Ghanaians to reduce their 
vulnerability and to raise their productivity, incomes and human conditions. 
Within it are elements directed to basic services, agricultural productivity, 
income, peripheral-poor-vulnerable geographic zones, opportunities for 
enhanced production by women, environmental protection and data generation - 
the main areas identifiable as directly affecting poor and vulnerable 
Ghanaians, especially women, children and residents of the Northern and Upper 
Regions and of urban slums.
Costings: Substantial, Manageable, Sustainable
Over three years the programmes would require of the order of $100-200 million 
in external support. Set beside a total of $2,000 million odd external
concessional resource transfers (of the order of $50 per Ghanaian per year) 
that 5 to 6% appears perfectly reasonable as a social fabric and human
condition restoration, production by the poor now augmentation and future
productivity boosting investment.
A substantial proportion of the funding - e.g. metal for implements, paper for 
texts, pump spares - will generate counterpart funds useable within the
overall programme. This is necessary because in several cases the most
binding constraint on effective action is that on foreign exchange (imports). 
Beyond that government resources are primarily ones already devoted to the
sectors in question primarily personnel (not very productively of present
because of lack of working capital or complementary resources).
Ultimately the cost of the programmes will be met largely by the taxpayers 
(which may be progressive) and those participating in them (basically
proportional). Some - e.g. borehole maintenance, implement production - can 
be fully or largely self financing in local currency terms from the start and 
others - e.g. the women’s production and pond desilting - can quickly become 
so.
Benefits: Estimation and Significance
The benefits to be derived from the programme can be described as speculative, 
subject to wide errors of estimation or "soft". It is prudent to admit that 
fact. But the same applies with only a little less force to more conventional 
projects and programmes. Many rural projects' payoff estimates depend on net 
gain from new technique estimates and farmer takeup rates which are rather 
less based on even rough surveying, a consensus of informed opinion and cross 
checking results for plausibility than is the case in this programme. Because 
of price uncertainties - and others affecting actual as opposed to nominal 
capacity output - most projects benefit/cost ratios should be seen as ranges 
not points. Social cost/benefit analysis is widely accepted but by its nature 
uses "soft" estimates.
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That said reasonable first approximation gains projections are substantial.
By the end of the three year period the annual gains should be of the order
of:
a. 60,000 lines saved (5 per 1000 reduction in overall and 10-20 per 1000 in 
infant mortality) by strengthened primary health care;
b. 135 to 172,500 person years of time from reduced illness (at 10 days per 
patient over 4 to 5 million patients) - relating primarily to basic drug 
supply, immunisation and first aid;
c. rehabilitation of Northern and Upper Region primary schools allowing
50,000 more primary and 200,000 more adult education students plus 
2,000,000 primary and adult education students nationally receiving 
better education - and therefore increasing their future productivity - 
because of enhanced textbook supply;
d. averting loss of access to nearby pure water by about 3,000,000 Ghanaians 
now served by boreholes with no assured servicing backup (basically 
because of lack of spares). If the loss occurred, about 1,000,000 women
and girls would have to spend 1j to 4 hours a day trudging to (often 
polluted) water sources and back - an annual cost saving from the 
boreholes of 250,000 woman years;
e. valueing production grains from implements is hard under conditions of
extreme scarcity leading - especially in the Northern and Upper Regions - 
to use of totally worn out (say 1 to 2 inches metal remaining) hoes or 
even wooden substitutes (a local but most inappropriate technology) and 
to be unable to clear bush, remove stones or desilt ponds for lack of 
shovels, crowbars, pickaxes and matchets. An estimate of five times the 
retail price in ouput gained (by raising labour productivity and work 
which can be done) - implying an annual gain in agricultural production 
of $40 to 50 million is not unreasonable;
f. the Northern and Upper Region productivity enhancement (shea nut) and
rehabilitation (pond desilting) projects could involve up to 125,000
households and yield a shea nut, grain and vegetable output gain of $9 to
$12.5 million plus a presently hard to quantify gain from reduced
livestock loses as a result of dry season water supply enhancement;
g. the labour intensive public works programme could employ up to 150,000
persons (from - say - 100,000 households); valuing its output at cash
cost plus locally provided labour and inputs (which may be an
underestimate given the backlog of economically as well as socially 
desirable small maintenance, rehabilitation and construction projects) 
gives a figure of the order of $6 to $6.5 million;
h. while most of the gains of the mobility project can be treated as 
subsumed in the health and education ones, by extending the serviceable 
life of vehicles a saving of the order of $5 million a year should be 
realised.
Valuing the person years made available by reduced illness and reduced water
collection time poses special problems. The average incremental value of a
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working day is probably of the order of Cedi 200 (say $1.33) albeit this 
varies over both location and season. Assuming that H5% of the time is used 
for production the rough order of magnitude of economic gains would be of the 
order oft $55-65 million. The other 55? time use would include a high 
proportion of socially useful activities, e.g. childcare, cleansing and 
washing, food preparation, adult education (now often constrained, especially 
for women by workload). It is somewhat arbitrary not to value these - largely 
but not wholly female - activities, but GDP statistics do not do so, unless 
they are performed by a waged employee not by a household member.
In summary the potential annual gains came to:
i. 60,000 lives saved;
ii. $115-135 million additional production and vehicle savings;
iii. 150,000 additional primary pupils and adult students and improved 
quality of education for 2,000,000 pupils and students;
iv. reduction of social and human costs of ill health plus additional time 
for housekeeping and environmental sanitation activities.
The three items to which no monetary value is attached clearly do have 
economic as well as social or human value.
The $115-135 million represents of the order of 2\% of GDP. This is not 
negligible at the macro level especially as it is a buildup over three years 
which would presumably be extended thereafter. Further, the programmes are
designed to relate to identifiable groups of poor and vulnerable people. 
About two thirds of all cash or self provisioning gains would go to them, 
especially because their water, health posts, schools and tool needs are "end 
of the line" ones which suffer first from cutbacks. $77 to $90 million would 
represent a 15 to 18% increase in their cash and kind income (plus the non 
quantified benefits). This can hardly be dismissed as trivial.
Brief Programme Notes
Primary health care expansion and upgrading would center on a national 
essential drug supply programme requiring about $5 million a year in external 
support. Partial cost recovering (drug cost excluding distribution, up to 25? 
of patients given local level waivers) could yield Cedi 500 million 
counterpart funds to support rehabilitation of buildings, an honorarium to the 
(now voluntary) health post cadre, transport and training.
Additional external support of up to $5 million a year would be needed for 
basic supplies, technical assistance (strengthening local manufacturing 
capacity and quality), primary health care unit equipment (e.g. 
refrigerators), additional cycles and vehicles to enhance mobility and 
strengthening Central Medical Stores delivery and cold store capabilities.
Primary and adult educations key external input is $4 million a year in paper 
to allow printing of 10,000,000 odd primary and adult education texts and 
pamphlets. This would need to be complemented with pencils, erasers, chalk, a
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limited number of vehicles, bicycles (incentive to and mobility for teachers), 
and spares. The first year total might be $7 million with under $5 million a 
year (including paper) thereafter.
Partial cost recovery on texts and pamphlets could yield perhaps Cedi 630 
million a year to cover printing, adult education tutor honoraria (basically 
to primary school teachers for extra work) and training and Northern and Upper 
Region school rehabilitation and refurnishing. The enrollment - especially of 
girls - in these regions is well below the national average and many schools 
are both in a state of disrepair and with no furniture. Funding should go to 
parents groups for wood and tools to be used with community labour to 
construct furniture and to carry out repairs - probably to teachers houses as 
well as school buildings proper.
Borehole water maintenance focuses on the 7 ,5 00 borehole pumps needing refits 
every other year with a backlog of 2,500 now overdue for refit and a desirable 
stock level of 3,700 kits. The cost of 17,500 kits (for three years plus 
basic inventory) would be about $6 to $6.2 million. In addition 2,000 new 
pumps (1,500 replacements, 500 inventory) would cost $1 million. Beyond the 
initial year, CIDA backed buildup of local kit building capacity should reduce 
import requirements (and change some of them from parts to steel).
If user communities were charged when (and if) refits or replacements were 
provided, there is little doubt they would be willing to pay the full cost of
the spares and pumps in Cedis. This would be much more cost effective (and
acceptable) than attempting monthly household level user fee collection. The 
proceeds could be of the order of Cedi 350-375 million per year, perhaps 
20-25? of which would cover the water corporation's local cost on repair and 
replacement leaving 75-80? to bolster its precarious general finances.
Basic tool availability (more accurately non availability in much of the 
country) is a significant barrier to enhanced peasant productivity. The
bottleneck is not lack of serviceable domestic capacity with proven ability to 
produce acceptable tools. Rather it is of foreign exchange to import steel 
and fittings to use in the manufacturing process.
Approximately $3.75 million a year could provide the imports to manufacture - 
say - 3 million matchets (cutlasses), 1,000,000 hoes, 200,000 each shovels and 
axes and smaller numbers of pickaxes, hammers, chisels, adzes and 
wheelbarrows. These could be sold at a profit to the enterprises so that
counterpart funds of the order of Cedit 550-600 million should be generated.
Of that amount perhaps one half could be used to finance Northern and Upper 
Region production rehabilitation and expansion (in large part by initial tool 
provision) and the balance toward local costs of selected research and
extension and of road rehabilitation and maintenance in these regions and in 
the more isolated parts of the Volta and Brong Ahafo regions.
During droughts and the normal dry season in rural areas and in urban low
income areas there is both a need to raise incomes and "involuntary leisure 
time" (no only very low productivity farm or "informal sector" tasks or work
available). Labour intensive small scale works schemes could provide such
income augmentation consistent both with social strengthening and human 
dignity enhancing of the persons and households involved. If well designed
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(including a project reserve to cope with needed rapid employment level 
augmentation in dry years) they could also be efficient means to maintaining, 
restoring or extending economic and social infrastructure. Detailed 
identification from village and neighbourhood level up could produce an 
extensive, articulated list relatively rapidly.
Seasonal (or drought period) rural employment concentrated in the Northern and 
Upper Regions and urban in low income neighbourhoods could be targeted at
150,000 persons (2/3 rural, 1/3 urban), 50? female, 50 days per person per
year maximum, at Cedi 100 for a six hour day (probably well above opportunity 
cost in these specific contexts although this would need to be verified) would 
cost about $5 million for wages.
To be cost effective perhaps $1.5 a year million a year in tools, simple 
equipment (e.g. for rock crushing, block moulding, ground compacting), and
buiilding materials (wood, cement, metal sheet) would be needed as 
complementary inputs. The total cost of $6.5 million a year would initially 
need to be externally financed given the fiscal position.
Commodity aid - e.g. wheat, milk powder, sugar, rice and cotton - would be a
suitable medium for financing. However, it should be fully monetised and the
proceeds used to pay wages and to buy the complementary inputs locally. Even 
in the Northern and Upper Regions, except in the worst drought years, food is 
physically available so that to use a literal food for work programme would 
raise transport needlessly, interfere with functioning local food markets and 
gratuitously add all of the problems of running a long distance food 
wholesale/retail system to the necessary ones of identifying and implementing 
projects and of hiring and remunerating workers.
Increasing women's ability to provision their households - through direct 
production for household use and/or augmenting cash incomes - is a priority 
both because of the overall need to augment poor household incomes and because 
women's cash and kind income is crucial in respect to child nutrition, 
cleansing (soap), clothing and health (clinic fees and drug charges). Women's 
income - as is typical in Africa - is not usually pooled into a common 
household budget, nor is male earner's income generally freely available for 
expenditure on behalf of children (with the apparent exception of school fees 
and related costs).
Two projects carried out by community based women producers assisted by the 
national women's council and UNICEF may serve as examples of what could be 
done over a wider range of activities and participants.
The first is improved fish smoking. Standard techniques have waste, spoilage 
and quality problems. A simple improved technology was used at a village 
called Chorkor. This has now been extended to over 50 villages augmenting 
both protein and calorie availability for the households of women engaged in 
smoking and significantly increasing their cash income from food processing 
which contributes a significant to dominant share of poor women's cash income 
in urban and some peri-urban or closely settled rural areas.
The second is production of improved weaning foods. The direct impact on 
child nutrition is significant because malnutrition rises sharply at the 
cessation of breast feeding. To afford the raw materials for the food and to
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cover maintenance and ultimate replacement costs of the adopted grain mills 
used, the women have built up "contract" grinding of other households' grain.
At present these two projects are of value to perhaps 2,500 to 5,000 poor
women and their households. That by itself is arguably trivial - albeit not 
to 2,500 women and probably 7>500 children! But the numbers are steadily 
growing - especially as natural extension from word of mouth information 
followed up by visits to present fish smokers and weaning food grinders has 
begun. Further these are very cost efficient programmes which appear to 
recover full capital costs (initially often donated) in less than a year.
The need is not simply to expand these two - which are basically coastal and 
forest zone - but to identify other opportunities - especially in the poorer 
Upper and Northern Regions. Two such potential projects are sketched in the 
next section.
Poverty and vulnerability reduction usually requires special attention to 
certain regions - in this case the poorer, drier, more isolated, higher 
transport cost (on sales and purchases), more drought vulnerable Northern and 
Upper Regions. Several of the projects covered above either have such a 
component or would benefit these regions disproportionately because present 
basic service provision is the most exiguous or deteriorated. However, 
additional initiatives focussing on removing barriers to increased peasant 
agricultural productivity are needed.
Three such are pond desilting (for livestock protection, grain output 
augmentation, vegetable cultivation), shea nut collection expansion and small 
scale, labour intensive rice cultivation probably combined with additional
training and use of animal power.
Approximately 1,000 ponds (natural or behind checkdams) in the Upper East and 
Northern Regions have silted severely to totally. This reduces dry season
water availability as well as traditional irrigation capacity around the pond
and downstream. The costs are increased livestock mortality, reduced grain 
crop production and limited ability of women to utilize free seeds and advise 
to establish or expand vegetable garden cultivation. The reason villagers 
(who in fact see the problem and wish to reverse it) cannot act is that 
outside the provincial capitals there have been virtually no pickaxes, shovels 
or wheelbarrows making silt and rock clearing impossible.
Assuming 1,000 ponds over three years and initial tool stock (30 shovels, 15 
pickaxes, 2 wheelbarrows per pond) the annual cost would be of the order of 
Cedi 60 million - if the agricultural tools project had been begun to increase 
local supply. From the third year replacement tools could be sold - or if the 
supply had become adequate could be acquired by villagers through normal 
commercial channels.
Vegetable gardening by women - especially during the dry season - could 
substantially augment nutrition (including during the hungry season). Free 
initial seed plus advisory services through the women's council should result 
in markedly increased takeup once ponds were desilted and garden irrigation 
water available. The advisory service cost should not exceed 12.5 million 
cedi annually and the seed $200,000.
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Reasonable output gains would be 10,000 tonnes of grain (Cedi 200 million at 
local, 375 million imported cif Accra, or 525 million imported and transported 
to Tamale) and 20,000 tonnes of vegetables (200 kilos times 100,000 likely 
participants) nominally worth of the order of Cedi 375 to 450 million at local 
prices. Both the grain and especially the vegetables would be used largely 
for household self provisioning in these regions which have very severe 
nutritional shortfalls.
Shea nut production (primarily gathering from groves of wild trees) is 
concentrated in the Upper West Region. Of the order of 20,000 tonnes are 
marketed largely via the Cocobod for export as an input into skin friendly 
soaps and cosmetics. Output is hampered by poisonous snakes. Groves in areas 
infected by them cannot have trees pruned, undergrowth cut down or nuts 
collected resulting (according to collectors' estimates) in a loss of a third 
of collectable output - say at least 10,000 tonnes.
The requirements for achieving collection are: rubber boots (for protection of 
collectors), cutlasses (for slashing bush, pruning trees, "cutting" snakes) 
and snake bite serum in local health units. About 30,000 women collectors ar< 
involved.
Initial free distribution of (imported from Cote d'Ivoire) boots at 
(domestic) matchets (cutlasses) with subsequent replacements sold plus - v 
the primary health care project - ensuring refrigerator and vaccine suppli 
would overcome the barriers to increased production and higher women's incor 
The women's council could serve as delivery and advisory agent. It could a 
advise the women on using traditional or modern credit unions to raise worl 
capital for bags to sell nuts by the bag to Cocobod rather than by the pan 
half as much to middlemen who then bulk them.
The costs would be of the order of $300,000 a year and Cedi 2.7 mi 
(cutlasses, including delivery of cutlasses and matchets). An output ga
10,000 tonnes would be worth Cedi 300 million at Cocobod prices an> 
million at fob export level.
Traditionally Ghanaian rice was Northern upland (dry) in seasonal 
courses or below ponds planted at the end of the rains. The new mech; 
large scale irrigated sector is high cost (perhaps three times cif pric 
import intensive (almost as much foreign exchange to grow a tonne as tc 
and more counting fuel to transport to Accra).
An intermediate approach - oxen plus small scale (e.g. archimedean scr 
irrigation around ponds, permanent water courses and Lake Volta is te< 
feasible and likely to prove financially attractive to peasant grower
The inputs required would be ploughs, water lift devices, oxen and i 
all domestically purchaseable or fabricatable. These could be pi 
loan but with a three year grace period given the newness of the a 
most of the area.
For 2,500 peasant households trained and provided with init) 
equipment (ox, plough, water lift device) the annual cost coulc 
order of Cedi 75 million with expansion thereafter less cost 
recovery began. The output gain by the third year 2 to 3 tonne
yields times 2 to 2.5 hectares per holding should yield 10,000 tonnes worth 
about Cedi 300 million at Northern and Upper Region local prices and Cedi ^50 
million cif (imported) or Cedi 500 million wholesale transported to Accra.
For this trio of projects the local costs could be financed from the 
counterpart funds generated through the sale of steel and fittings under the 
agricultural tool project. If they were not then $1.5 to 2 million a year 
additional finance would be required.
Delivery of basic services is severely hampered by lack of mobility. Some of 
the previous projects include vehicles and spares components but they do not, 
by their nature, address the underlying maintenance problem. For example in 
1986 of 2,000 odd nominal Health and Education vehicles about 500 were 
"runners", 700 off the road for repairs and 800 physically defunct or 
economically life expired.
The keys to overcoming this position of more repairable but awaiting repair 
vehicles than ones actually operational are: systematic spares acquisition
(including as a component of vehicle aid), training of mechanics (again partly 
in vehicle provision packages) and restoration of the capacity of the 
existing, but run down, ministerial regional workshops.
Direct import requirements would probably be of the order of $4 million a year
including vehicle rehabilitation, spares inventory establishment and normal 
maintenance, workshop replacement equipment and technical assistance in 
respect to programme design and/or training. Given the fiscal limitations - 
which are especially acutely felt by these ministries - Cedi 150 million a 
year out of local costs of Cedi 200-300 million a year (rising as the 
programme builds up momentum) would be needed from donor counterpart funds (or 
additional commodity aid - e.g. 500 tonnes cotton to be sold to the fibre 
constrained textile industry).
Local materials (wood and metal for vehicle rehabilitation and workshop repair 
plus some spares - e.g. tyres) would be about two thirds of cedi costs. The
balance would include training, an extra duty allowance of say $500 per year
to hold artisans once trained and general overhead expenses.
Data in relation to poverty, vulnerability and especially on how to link 
reducing these to enhancing production is inadequate. The standard 
statistical system does not - and realistically for some years will not be 
able to - provide it on a timely basis or within present programme capacity. 
Two pilot efforts have been begun:
a. an urban low income area (neighbourhood) household sample survey to 
identify income sources and levels, expenditure patterns and other basic 
social condition indicators;
b. ways and means to create a rapid warning system combining morbidity, 
malnutrition, local market price and rainfall data for the closed month 
by the end of the current month fed to a contingency monitoring unit 
feeding into the executive offices as an input into policy response with 
reference to pre-disaster avoiding or disaster containing and reversing 
action.
- 2 1 -
The results from these are expected to give indications as to priorities for 
further "quick and nasty" but broadly correct data collection on more specific 
topics to alter, extend coverage of or add to the projects/programmes sketched 
above. Total costs of the two initial endeavours are of the order of $50,000 
a year.
